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Abstract
We introduce a set-valued generalization of Nash equilibrium, called M equilibrium, which
is based on ordinal monotonicity – players’ choice probabilities are ranked the same as the
expected payoffs based on their beliefs – and ordinal consistency – players’ beliefs yield the
same ranking of expected payoffs as their choices. Using results from semi-algebraic geometry,
we prove there exist a finite number of M equilibria, each consisting of a finite number of con-
nected components. Generically, M -equilibria can be “color coded” by their ranks in the sense
that choices and beliefs belonging to the same M equilibrium have the same color. We show
that colorable M -equilibria are behaviorally stable, a concept that strengthens strategic stabil-
ity. Furthermore, set-valued and parameter-free M -equilibrium envelopes various parametric
models based on fixed-points, including QRE as well as a new and computationally simpler
class of models called µ Equilibrium.
We report the results of several experiments designed to contrast M -equilibrium predic-
tions with those of existing behavioral game-theory models. A first experiment considers five
variations of an asymmetric-matching pennies game that leave the predictions of Nash, various
versions of QRE, and level-k unaltered. However, observed choice frequencies differ substan-
tially and significantly across games as do players’ beliefs. Moreover, beliefs and choices are
heterogeneous and beliefs do match choices in any of the games. These findings contradict
existing behavioral game-theory models but accord well with the unique M equilibrium. Fol-
low up experiments employ 3 × 3 games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and
multipleM equilibria. The belief and choice data exhibit coordination problems that could not
be anticipated through the lens of existing behavioral game-theory models.
Keywords: M Equilibrium, µ Equilibrium, Behavioral Stability
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“Only now (1943) am I conscious my work has just been
‘drawing’ with paint. Drawing emphasizes lines, but in
painting, lines arise as the abstract limitations of planes to
conserve their great value.” — Piet Mondrian (1872 – 1944)1
1. Introduction
The central solution concept of game theory, the Nash equilibrium, rests on the assumption of
mutually consistent behavior: each player’s choice is optimal given others’ choices. While the
Nash equilibrium is defined in terms of a fixed-point condition on choices (Nash, 1950), it is
quiet about how they come about. Presumably, players form beliefs about others’ behavior and
use these to optimize their choices. Seen this way, the Nash assumption of mutually consistent
behavior is equivalent to the following two conditions: players’ choices are best responses to
their beliefs and players’ beliefs are correct.
Observed choices conform to Nash-equilibrium predictions in some settings, but a large
body of work in experimental game theory has documented systematic departures from Nash
equilibrium (e.g. Goeree and Holt, 2001). Nasar (1998) describes how the lack of experimental
support for his equilibrium concept caused Nash to lose confidence in the relevance of game
theory after which he turned to pure mathematics in his later research. Selten, who shared the
1994 Nobel Prize with Nash, likewise concluded that “game theory is for proving theorems, not
for playing games.”
This paper is motivated by the desire for an empirically relevant game theory. We introduce
a novel solution concept, M equilibrium, which replaces the assumption of perfect maximiza-
tion (“no mistakes”) with an ordinal monotonicity condition – players’ choice probabilities are
ranked the same as their associated expected payoffs – and the assumption of perfect beliefs
(“no surprises”) with an ordinal consistency condition – players’ beliefs yield the same ranking
of expected payoffs as their choices. If the latter condition holds, which does not require beliefs
to be homogeneous or correct, we say that players’ beliefs support their choices.
M equilibrium is a set-valued solution concept that puts beliefs and choices on an equal
footing. Specifically, M equilibrium considers all beliefs that support a certain equilibrium
choice and, dually, it considers all choices supported by a certain equilibrium belief. An M
1From Mondrian’s letter to art critic James Sweeney, see Bax (2001, p.20).
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equilibrium consists of the largest belief set and the largest choice set such that choices satisfy
ordinal monotonicity and beliefs support choices.
We prove there exists an M equilibrium for any normal-form game. We explore the geom-
etry of M equilibrium sets, which are examples of semi-algebraic sets (see e.g. Coste, 2002).
Borrowing results from semi-algebraic geometry, we show there are finite number of M equi-
libria, each consisting of a finite number of connected components. Generically, there can be
an even or odd number of M equilibria, unlike fixed-point theories, such as Nash equilibrium,
that generically yield an odd number of equilibria (e.g. Harsanyi, 1973). We show that Nash
equilibria arise as limit points of the M -equilibrium sets. There may be fewer, as many, or
more M equilibria than Nash equilibria. Moreover, an M equilibrium may contain zero, one,
or more Nash equilibria. Importantly, we show the measure of the M -equilibrium choice set
falls quickly with the number of players and the number of possible choices.
Generically, any M equilibrium can be “color coded” by the ranks of the equilibrium-choice
profiles in the sense that all choices and beliefs that belong to the same M equilibrium must
have the same color. To illustrate, consider the symmetric two-player game in Table 1 where
choice and belief profiles are compositions of red (R), yellow (Y ), and blue (B). This “Mondrian
game” has three symmetric M equilibria: the colored “planes” in the left panel of Figure 1
show theM -equilibrium choice sets, and the right panel shows the correspondingM -equilibrium
belief sets. Beliefs of a certain color support actions with the same color. The thick interior lines
reflecting payoff indifferences form the boundaries of the colored planes.2 Conform Mondrian’s
quote, drawing these lines is somewhat superfluous as all relevant information is encoded by
the planes, including the Nash equilibria. For example, since all three colored planes include
a vertex of the choice simplex, each color corresponds to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the point on the edge of the choice simplex where the red (or yellow) plane
borders the white plane corresponds to a degenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.3 These
are the five symmetric Nash equilibria of the Mondrian game.
We show that, generically, the interior of the M equilibrium sets consists of choices and
beliefs that are behaviorally stable. Roughly speaking, an M -equilibrium profile is behaviorally
stable when small errors in implementation or perception do not destroy its equilibrium nature.
In other words, an M -equilibrium profile is behaviorally stable when the profile is also an M -
2Together with the three lines (not shown) that divide the simplex in six equal parts, i.e. the three lines
where two of the three choice probabilities are equal.
3If (pR, pB , pY ) denotes the symmetric equilibrium profile then the red boundary point is (
2
3 ,
1
3 , 0) and the
yellow boundary point is ( 16 , 0,
5
6 ).
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R B Y
R 9, 9 6, 8 4, 4
B 8, 6 8, 8 2, 4
Y 4, 4 4, 2 5, 5
Table 1: Mondrian’s “composition of Red, Yellow, and Blue” game.
Figure 1: The symmetric M -equilibrium choice sets (left) and belief sets (right) for the Mon-
drian game in Table 1.
equilibrium profile for all nearby games. Obviously, the concept of behavioral stability builds
on ideas from the literature on refinements of Nash equilibrium (e.g. Van Damme, 1991), in
particular, Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986) “strategic stability.” The latter requires that nearby
games have a Nash-equilibrium profile that is close to, but not necessarily equal to, the Nash-
equilibrium profile of the original game. Behavioral stability strengthens this requirement by
insisting that perturbations of the game do not change the set of M -equilibrium profiles. We
believe this stronger requirement is needed for M equilibrium to be empirically relevant.
We establish M equilibrium as a “meta theory” of various parametric models that rely on
fixed-point conditions. In particular, we introduce a class of µ-Equilibrium models in which
choice probabilities are parametric functions of the ranks of their associated expected payoffs.
µ-Equilibrium choices follow from a fixed-point condition and µ-equilibrium beliefs support the
fixed-point choice profile. We show that µ-equilibrium choices are easy to compute and typically
3
supported by a continuous set of beliefs. Moreover, we prove that an M -equilibrium of a given
color contains all different µ-equilibrium fixed points supported by beliefs of the same color.
Conversely, by varying µ, the different µ-equilibrium fixed-points “fill out” the M -equilibrium
choice set.
We report the results of a series of laboratory experiments that test M equilibrium. The
first experiment considers five variations of an asymmetric-matching pennies game that leave
the predictions of various behavioral game-theory models (Nash, QRE, and level-k) unaltered.
However, observed choice frequencies differ substantially and significantly across games as do
players’ beliefs. Moreover, beliefs do not match choices, and beliefs and choices are heteroge-
neous in any of the games. These findings contradict the behavioral game-theory models but
accord well with the unique M equilibrium.
Follow up experiments exploit the fact that there can be multipleM equilibria in games with
a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, the experiment employs variations of
3× 3 games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but several M equilibria. The belief
and choice data reveal the resulting coordination problems that play no role in traditional fixed-
point theories such as Nash and QRE (which both yield unique predictions in these games).
1.1. Prior Approaches
A distinct feature of M equilibrium is that beliefs and choices play a dual role. Choices satisfy
an ordinal monotonicity condition, which determines the largest set of choices supported by a
certain belief, and beliefs satisfy an ordinal consistency condition, which determines the largest
set of beliefs that support a certain choice. In particular, M -equilibrium beliefs may differ
across players and may differ from M -equilibrium choices. In other words, M equilibrium
allows for “surprises” unlike Nash and QRE, which assume correct beliefs.
1.1.1. Quantal Response Equilibrium
McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1995) Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) incorporates the possi-
bility of errors into an equilibrium framework. In particular, the Nash best-response corre-
spondences are replaced by smooth and increasing response functions, known as the “quantal
response” or “better response” functions. This is the “QR” part. In addition, QRE retains the
Nash-equilibrium assumption that beliefs are correct so that choice probabilities are derived
relative to the true expected payoffs taking into account others’ error-prone behavior. This is
the “E” part.
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L R
U 1, 6 2, 7
D 4, 5 3, 8
Table 2: A simple dominance-solvable game.
A prominent behavioral economist once quipped “I like the Q and the R but not the E.” To
illustrate why QRE’s equilibrium assumption is problematic, consider the dominance-solvable
game in Table 2. If p (q) denotes the probability with which Column (Row) chooses L (U)
then p∗ = q∗ = 0 in the unique Nash equilibrium. Logit QRE choice and belief probabilities,
in contrast, follow from
q =
eλRπR(U)
eλRπR(U) + eλRπR(D)
=
1
1 + eλR(1+2p)
p =
eλCπC(L)
eλCπC(L) + eλCπC(R)
=
1
1 + eλC(3−2q)
with λR and λC non-negative “precision” or “rationality” parameters determining the sensitivity
of choices with respect to expected payoffs. Note that the choice probabilities on the left are
the same as those used to compute expected payoffs on the right. In other words, QRE beliefs
(and choices) are fixed-points of a set of non-transcendental equations.
If QRE is seen as a model of boundedly-rational players who make mistakes it seems in-
consistent to assume they are able to solve the above fixed-point equations. Indeed, not even
fully rational players can solve these equations, which admit approximate numerical solutions
only (and only after picking specific values for λR and λC). Second, while players’ choices may
differ in equilibrium, players must have identical beliefs about the likelihood of each choice, i.e.
all players’ beliefs must coincide with a single (fixed) point in the probability simplex. This
level of homogeneity in beliefs is unrealistic and will be falsified by any experiment that elicits
beliefs as elements of the simplex, see Section 5.
Importantly, the “E” in QRE is far more demanding than the equilibrium assumption
underlying Nash equilibrium. Not only does it involve solving transcendental equations rather
than simply checking for consistency (of the type “if Row chooses D then Column chooses R,
and if Column chooses R then Row chooses D”), beliefs also have to be extremely precise.
Any small change in beliefs results in a different choice profile, causing the QRE fixed-point
conditions to be violated. In contrast, the Nash equilibrium is often robust to small, and
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possibly heterogenous, variations in beliefs. For the game in Table 2, for instance, Row’s and
Column’s best responses coincide with Nash-equilibrium choices for any beliefs they hold. In
other words, even when Row and Column have different and incorrect beliefs about what choices
may transpire, their best responses to their beliefs support the Nash equilibrium in this game.
We are not suggesting that the Nash equilibrium is a more robust or a more reliable predictor
of behavior than QRE. For that, its degenerate predictions (in case of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium) are too easily falsified by a single deviant choice. QRE avoids such zero-likelihood
problems by offering a statistical theory of behavior in games. But QRE is too demanding
about the “E” part by insisting that beliefs are homogeneous – even when players have different
rationality parameters – and correct – even when that requires solving transcendental equations.
While the “QR” part avoids zero-likelihood problems when QRE is applied to choice data, its
“E” part will surely be rejected by any data on beliefs (see Section 5).
Approaches that do allow for surprises can generally be divided into “equilibrium” or “non-
equilibrium” models.
1.1.2. Equilibrium Belief-Based Models
An early example of an equilibrium model of surprises is Random Belief Equilibrium (Friedman
and Mezzetti, 2005). In this model, players’ beliefs are draws from a distribution around
a central strategy profile, called the “focus.” Players best respond to their beliefs and the
equilibrium condition is that expected choices coincide with the focus of the belief distributions.
Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer (2008) introduce a family of equilibrium models where player
i’s choice probabilities follow from a logit quantal response function with rationality parameter
λi. In the most general formulation, called Subjective Quantal Response Equilibrium (SQRE),
players have subjective beliefs about the distributions from which others’ rationality parameters
are drawn. The (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium condition is on players’ strategies, i.e. how rationality
parameters map into choices, rather than on the choices themselves.
This general model can be restricted in two possible ways to establish a connection with
related models. First, in Truncated Quantal Response Equilibrium (TQRE), players have
downward-looking beliefs about others’ rationality parameters. Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer
(2008) show that the (non-equilibrium) Cognitive Hierarchy model can be seen as a limit case of
discretized TQRE. Second, in Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE), players
have common and correct beliefs about the distributions of the rationality parameters. In this
case, the equilibrium condition is on choices as in standard QRE (which arises as a limit case
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when the rationality-parameter distributions are degenerate).
1.1.3. Non-Equilibrium Belief-Based Models
Prominent examples include the level-k model (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995)
and the related Cognitive Hierarchy model (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004). In these models,
players differ in skill and their beliefs about others’ skill levels are “downward looking.” In the
level-k model, level-0 randomizes or makes a “non-strategic” choice (if such a choice is easily
identified). Level-1 players best respond to level-0 choices, level-2 players best respond to level-
1 choices, etc. In the Cognitive Hierarchy model, level-0 randomizes while level-k players, with
k ≥ 1, assume others’ skill levels follow a truncated Poisson distribution over 0, . . . , k − 1 and
best respond to the implied distribution of choices.
Noisy Introspection (Goeree and Holt, 2004) is also a non-equilibrium model, but it does
not assume downward-looking beliefs. Instead, it is based on the idea that forming higher-order
beliefs is increasingly difficult.4
1.1.4. Differences with M Equilibrium
M equilibrium differs from these prior approaches in several ways. First, M equilibrium is a
set-valued, rather than a fixed-point, solution concept. As a result, it is typically simpler to
compute. Second, M equilibrium is a parameter-free theory, unlike the aforementioned models
that require specific parametric assumptions for the quantal responses (e.g. logit-based SQRE),
the belief distributions (e.g. Dirichlet-based RBE), the distribution of levels (e.g. Poisson-based
CH), etc. As a result, its predictions can be confronted with (experimental) data without the
need to estimate parameters. Third, M equilibrium treats beliefs in a way that does not neatly
fit the “equilibrium” versus “non-equilibrium” classification. Unlike level-k type models, M
equilibrium does not make ad hoc assumptions about the belief-formation process to arrive at
a specific model for disequilibrium beliefs (whether it be in terms of others’ “levels of strategic
thinking,” as in level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy, or in terms of others’ “rationality parameters,”
as in SQRE and its descendants). And unlike RBE or QRE type models, M equilibrium does
not assume correct beliefs. RatherM equilibrium includes all beliefs that yield the same ranking
of expected payoffs. The rationale is that all those beliefs support the same set of choices, and,
in this sense, they sustain an equilibrium situation in which there is “no need for change.”
4Goeree and Holt (2004) show that Noisy Introspection can be interpreted as a stochastic version of ratio-
nalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984).
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1.2. Organization
The next section introduces the rank correspondence, which replaces the best-response cor-
respondence and is used to implement the ordinal monotonicity condition that options with
higher expected payoffs are chosen more likely without specifying by how much. Stated differ-
ently, choice probabilities are ranked the same as expected payoffs, a requirement sometimes
referred to as “stochastic rationality.” Section 3 pairs the ordinal monotonicity condition for
choices with the ordinal consistency condition for beliefs to define anM equilibrium. Existence
for general normal-form games is proven and several properties and examples are discussed.
Section 4 introduces a parametric class of µ-Equilibrium models where choices follow from
fixed-point conditions. We show that M equilibrium “minimally envelopes” these parametric
models. Section 5 reports results from various experiments designed to contrast M -equilibrium
predictions with those of the existing behavioral game-theory models. Section 6 offers a sum-
mary of our results, and the concluding Section 7 discusses several extensions of the basic
M -equilibrium approach and discusses the value of M equilibrium when its predictions accord
well with the data and when they do not. The Appendices contain the proofs not shown in the
main text, results from statistical tests based on the experimental data, as well as additional
details about the methods used in the data analysis.
2. Preliminaries
Consider a finite normal-form game G = (N, {Ci}ni=1, {Πi}ni=1), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set
of players, and for i ∈ N , Ci = {ci1, . . . , ciKi} is player i’s choice set and Πi : C → R, with
C =
∏n
j=1Cj, is player i’s payoff function. Let Σi denote the set of probability distributions
over Ci. An element σ
c
i ∈ Σi is player i’s choice profile, which is a mapping from Ci to Σi,
where σci (ci) is the probability that player i chooses ci ∈ Ci. Player i’s beliefs about player
j ∈ N are represented by σbij, which is a mapping from Cj to Σj, where σbij(cj) is the probability
that i assigns to player j choosing cj ∈ Cj.5 The concatenation of the σbij is player i’s belief
profile, σbi , which is a mapping from C to Σ =
∏n
j=1Σj. Player i’s expected payoff given belief
σbi is πi(σ
b
i ) =
∑
c∈C pi(c)Πi(c) where pi(c) =
∏n
j=1 σ
b
ij(cj). Choosing cik for sure is represented
by the choice profile eik = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Σi and the associated expected payoff, given
belief σbi (with σ
b
ii = eik), is denoted πik(σ
b
i ). Finally, Ei = {eik}Kik=1 represents all of player i’s
5Including player i’s beliefs about her own choices in σbi is done for notational convenience only. Throughout
we assume player i’s belief about her own choices are correct, i.e. σbii = σ
c
i for i ∈ N .
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“pure choices” and πi = (πi1, . . . , πiKi) ∈ RKi denotes the vector of associated expected payoffs.
A player’s best-response correspondence maps the vector of expected payoffs to a player’s
choice profile. This mapping may be point or set valued, e.g. the best-response correspondence
assigns probability 1 to the choice with the strictly highest payoff but it allows for mixtures
when there is a tie for the highest payoff. Player i’s best-response correspondence can generally
be defined as the convex hull of the elements in Ei that yield the highest expected payoff.
BRi(πi) = Conv
({
σi ∈ Ei | ∀ k, ℓ such that σik > σiℓ ⇒ πik ≥ πiℓ
})
(1)
For the case of Ki = 3 possible actions, the best-response correspondence is illustrated in the
top panel of Figure 2. The left-most simplex pertains to the case when there is a strict highest
payoff in which case the best-response is one of the vertices of the simplex. In the middle panel,
two options tie for the highest payoff and now the best-response correspondence produces an
edge of the simplex. Finally, in the right panel all three options have the same payoff and the
best-response correspondence is the entire simplex.
To allow for the possibility of suboptimal choices, we soften the payoff maximization rule
that underlies the best-response correspondence (as in QRE) but in a manner that retains its
ordinal nature (unlike QRE). Let ri1 = (1, 2, . . . , Ki)/(
1
2
Ki(Ki+1)) ∈ Σi and let Ri = {rik}Ki!k=1
denote the set of vectors that result by permuting all elements of ri1. Then player i’s rank
correspondence is defined as:
ranki(πi) = Conv
({
σi ∈ Ri | ∀ k, ℓ such that σik > σiℓ ⇒ πik ≥ πiℓ
})
(2)
The bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates the rank correspondence for the case Ki = 3. If there
is no tie the rank correspondence yields one of the six points in the left panel, when two payoffs
tie the rank correspondence produces one of the six line segments in the middle panel, and
when all three payoffs tie the rank correspondence produces the hexagon in the right panel.
The best-response and rank correspondences share some important features. First, their
images are closed and convex sets (see e.g. Figure 2), i.e. both are upper-hemicontinuous
correspondences. Second, both define idempotent mappings in the sense that BRi ◦BRi = BRi
and ranki ◦ranki = ranki. Consider, for instance, the two-dimensional case: BRi(x, y) = (1, 0)
when x > y, BRi(x, y) = (0, 1) when x < y, and BRi(x, y) = ∪0≤p≤1(p, 1 − p) when x = y.
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Note that BRi(1, 0) = (1, 0), BRi(0, 1) = (0, 1), and
⋃
0≤ p≤ 1
BRi(p, 1− p) = (1, 0) ∪
⋃
0≤ q≤ 1
(q, 1− q) ∪ (0, 1)
where the middle term occurs when p = 1
2
. Hence, BRi(BRi(x, y)) = BRi(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈
IR2. A similar argument establishes ranki(ranki(x, y)) = ranki(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ IR2. This
result is intuitive: ranking alternatives that were already ranked results in the same outcome.
The best-response and rank correspondences also differ in important ways. First, the image
of the rank correspondence is contained in the interior of the simplex, i.e. all options are assigned
strictly positive probability, while the best-response correspondence may assign zero probability
to one or more options. Second, non-optimal options matter for the rank correspondence
but not for the best-response correspondence (which is why there are only three vertices in
the top-left simplex compared to six vertices in the lower-left simplex of Figure 2). Stated
differently, ranking options retains all ordinal information about their expected payoffs, while
some information is lost when picking only the best. As a result, BR ◦ rank = BR, but not
necessarily rank ◦BR = rank.
3. M Equilibrium
Let σc and σb denote the concatenations of players’ choice and belief profiles respectively, and
let rank and π denote the concatenations of players’ rank correspondences and profit functions.
We write π(σb) for the profile of expected payoffs based on players’ beliefs and π(σc) for the
profile of expected payoffs when beliefs are correct, i.e. σbi = σ
c for i ∈ N . The set of possible
choice profiles is Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi and the set of possible belief profiles is Σ
n.
Definition 1 We say (M
c
,M
b
) ⊂ Σ × Σn form an M Equilibrium if they are the closures
of the largest non-empty sets M c and M b that satisfy
rank(σc) ⊆ rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σc)) (3)
for all σc ∈M c, σb ∈M b. The set of M equilibria of G is denoted M(G) = (Mc(G),Mb(G)).
The characterization of M equilibrium in (3) provides an intuitive generalization of Nash equi-
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librium. The assumption of perfect maximization, σc ∈ BR(π(σb)), is replaced with an or-
dinal monotonicity condition, rank(σc) ⊆ rank(π(σb)), and the assumption of perfect beliefs,
σb = σc, is replaced with an ordinal consistency condition, rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σc)).
Proposition 1 M(G) is non-empty for any normal-form game.
Proof. Recall from Section 2 that the rank correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous and
idempotent. Kakutani’s (1941) fixed-point theorem implies existence of a profile, σ, that sat-
isfies σ ∈ rank(π(σ)), and since rank is idempotent we have rank(σ) ⊆ rank(π(σ)). Hence,
M
c ⊇ {σ} and M b ⊇ {σ} × · · · × {σ}.
Example 1. Consider a matching-pennies game where a Row and Column player choose Heads
or Tails. Row receives 1 if their choices match and loses 1 if they don’t. Column’s payoffs are the
negative of Row’s payoffs. Let σu denote the profile where each player randomizes uniformly over
Heads and Tails. Players’ expected payoffs are the same when evaluated at σu, which is thus a
Nash-equilibrium profile. Moreover, rank(BR(π(σu))) = rank(π(σu)), so the Nash-equilibrium
condition, σu ∈ BR(π(σu)), implies the M -equilibrium condition, rank(σu) ⊆ rank(π(σu)). It
is readily verified that σu is the only profile such that rank(σu) ⊆ rank(π(σu)). Hence, M(G)
consists of a single Nash-equilibrium profile in this (non-generic) example.
In general, rank ◦ BR ̸= rank, so the argument in Example 1 cannot be applied to show
that any Nash equilibrium is an M equilibrium. For instance, for a pure-strategy Nash-
equilibrium profile σ in a game with three or more options, rank(σ) is multi-valued while
rank(π(σ)) is single-valued when the expected payoffs of non-optimal choices are unequal.
Hence, rank(σ) ̸= BR(rank(σ)) and rank(σ) ̸⊆ rank(π(σ)), so pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium
profiles are generally not examples of M equilibria. Instead, they arise as boundary points of
the M -equilibrium sets. The same is true for degenerate mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium pro-
files that lie on the boundary of the simplex.6 We next present a slightly relaxed definition of
M equilibrium that allows for the inclusion of these boundary cases more directly.
3.1. Semi-Algebraic Geometry of M Equilibrium
Here we present an alternative definition of M equilibrium that highlights its connection with
semi-algebraic geometry. Recall that a semi-algebraic set is defined by a finite number of poly-
6Note that rank(BR(π(σc))) = rank(π(σc)) for any non-degenerate mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium profile
σc, which are thus always part of M equilibrium (see also Example 1).
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R B Y
R 6, 6 2, 6 1, 1
B 6, 2 3, 3 1, 8
Y 1, 1 8, 1 9, 9
R B Y
R 3, 3 6, 6 9, 5
B 6, 6 3, 3 9, 2
Y 5, 9 2, 9 10, 10
Table 3: Examples of non-generic symmetric two-player games with three possible choices. For
the game in the left panel, a payoff-indifference line lies on the simplex’ boundary. For the
game in the right panel, a payoff-indifference line lies on one of the simplex’ diagonals.
nomial equalities and inequalities. Let R =
∏n
i=1Ri denote the set of all possible permutations
of players’ rank vectors. For r = (r1k1 , . . . , rnkn) ∈ R let Σr = {σ ∈ Σ | rank(σ) ⊇ r}.7
Definition 2 Fix r ∈ R. We say (M cr,M br) ⊂ Σr × Σn form an Mr Equilibrium if they are
the closures of the largest non-empty sets M cr and M
b
r that satisfy
(σcik − σciℓ)(πik(σc)− πiℓ(σc)) > 0 or σcik(πik(σc)− πiℓ(σc)) = 0
(πik(σ
c)− πiℓ(σc))(πik(σb)− πiℓ(σb)) > 0 or σcik(πik(σb)− πiℓ(σb)) = 0
(4)
for all k ̸= ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , Ki}, i ∈ N , σc ∈ M cr , and σb ∈ M br . The set of M equilibria of G is
M(G) = ∪r∈R (M cr(G),M br(G)).
Remark 1. Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent except for profiles that lie on the simplex’
boundary. For these boundary profiles, Definition 2 relaxes the constraint that σc cannot
have more equal elements than π(σc) as implied by rank(σc) ⊆ rank(π(σc)) in Definition 1.
As a result, also degenerate Nash profiles satisfy (4) while they generally do not satisfy (3).
Non-emptiness of M(G) under Definition 2 thus follows from existence of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 shows thatM equilibrium is generally characterized by a mixture of inequalities and
equalities. If only inequalities suffice to describe the M equilibrium then its choice and belief
sets have full dimension. Because if inequalities hold for some choice and belief profiles then,
by continuity of expected payoffs, they hold for choice and belief profiles that are sufficiently
close. In general, however, semi-algebraic sets can have components of various dimensions.
Example 2. The top-left panel of Figure 3 shows the different components of the symmetric
M -equilibrium choice set for the game in the left panel of Table 3. The colored lines in Figure 3
correspond to cases where an equality in (4) holds, either because two expected payoffs are equal
7Each of the Σr corresponds to one of the |R | =
∏
i∈N Ki! equally-sized parts of Σ and Σ = ∪r∈R Σr.
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Figure 3: The left panel shows the symmetric M -equilibrium choices and the right panel shows
M -equilibrium beliefs. The top and middle panels correspond to the non-generic games in
Table 3 and the bottom panel to the generic game in Table 4. The green curves indicate M -
equilibrium profiles where two expected payoffs are equal, the red lines indicate M -equilibrium
profiles contained in the simplex’ boundary, and the grey lines indicate M -equilibrium profiles
contained in one of the simplex’ diagonals. The blue shaded areas correspond to interior M -
equilibrium profiles.
14
1R B Y
2 3 R B Y
R 14 12 30
B 12 4 32
Y 30 32 10
2 3 R B Y
R 32 17 22
B 17 36 8
Y 22 8 40
2 3 R B Y
R 4 26 23
B 26 32 20
Y 23 20 6
Table 4: A generic symmetric three-player game with three possible choices.
(green) or because the profile lies on the simplex’ boundary (red). The grey lines correspond
to the simplex’ diagonals. For this non-generic game, there are four M equilibria: two have
dimension zero (the Nash-equilibrium profiles σc = (1, 0, 0) and σc = ( 8
13
, 0, 5
13
)), one has
dimension one (the closure of the set of profiles σc = (p, 0, 1 − p) for 0 < p < 1
2
), and one has
dimension two (the closure of the set of profiles σc = (σc1, σ
c
2, σ
c
3) that satisfy 0 < σ
c
1 < σ
c
2 < σ
c
3
and σc1 + σ
c
2 + σ
c
3 = 1). Except for the Nash-equilibrium profile σ
c = (1, 0, 0), these are also
M -equilibria under Definition 1. The middle-panel shows a case where the symmetric M -
equilibrium choice and belief sets are one dimensional and have measure zero. The bottom
panel shows that theM -equilibrium sets can, generically, have multiple connected components.
Proposition 2 For any normal-game G, there is at least one and at most a finite number of
M equilibria, each of which consist of a finite number of components.
Proof. That there is at least one M equilibrium was shown in Proposition 1. That there are
finitely many M equilibria follows from basic results in semi-algebraic geometry, see e.g. Coste
(2002).
3.2. Coloring of M Equilibrium
The lower-dimensional M -equilibrium components shown in the top and middle panels of Fig-
ure 3 arise when a special condition is met: a payoff-indifference line coincides with the boundary
of the simplex or one of its diagonals. Games for which this occurs are non-generic in the sense
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that if the game is perturbed slightly then these lower-dimensional components disappear and
only the sets of full dimension remain. The reason that full-dimensional sets do not disappear
is that the rank correspondence is single-valued on the interior of these sets and, hence, the
expected payoffs can be strictly ranked. By continuity of expected payoffs, this strict ranking
remains the same if the game is slightly perturbed. Also, the expected payoffs based on the sup-
porting beliefs must have the same unique ranks, which allows us to “color” the M -equilibrium
choice and belief sets by their rank vector.
Proposition 3 Generically,
(i) an M equilibrium is a set of positive measure in Σ× Σn,
(ii) anM equilibrium is characterized or “colored” by the rank vector r = (r1k1 , . . . , rnkn) ∈ R,
(iii) Nash-equilibrium profiles and σu are boundary points of some M-equilibrium choice set.
Example 3. To illustrate, consider the four 2 × 2 games in Table 5. Let σR = (q, 1 − q) and
σC = (p, 1− p) denote Row’s and Column’s choice profiles, where q and p are the probabilities
that Row and Column choose A respectively. Then, for instance, rank(σR) = (
1
3
, 2
3
) when q < 1
2
and rank(σR) = (
2
3
, 1
3
) when q > 1
2
. Since the entries in the rank vectors add up to 1, we can
characterize any M equilibrium by the first entries of the players’ rank vectors. That leaves
four possible M equilibria that can be color coded: (1
3
, 1
3
) (red), (1
3
, 2
3
) (grey), (2
3
, 1
3
) (blue), and
(2
3
, 2
3
) (yellow).
In Figure 4, the left panels show the actions sets, Σ
c
, and the right panels show the belief sets,
Σ
b
, for the four games in Table 5.8 In the left panels, the square at (1
2
, 1
2
) indicates the uniform
randomization profile, σu, and the disks indicate Nash equilibria. For each of the four games,
the beliefs sets are shown in the same color as the actions they support. For example, in the
symmetric coordination game, A has a higher expected payoff only when a player believes the
chance the other plays A exceeds 2
3
. The requirement rank(σc) = rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σc))
then implies Σ
c
= Σ
b
= [2
3
, 1]2 as shown by the same-sized yellow squares in the top panels of
Figure 4. In contrast, B has a higher expected payoff when a player believes the chance the
other plays A does not exceed 2
3
. Now, the requirement rank(σc) = rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σc))
implies Σ
c
= [0, 1
2
]2 and Σ
b
= [0, 2
3
]2 as shown by the red squares in the top-left and top-right
panels of Figure 4 respectively.
8To be precise, the choice sets are based on only the first entries of σR and σC , i.e. q for Row and p for
Column (as the two entries of the σ’s add up to 1). Correspondingly, the belief sets are based on Row’s belief
about p and Column’s belief about q. This allows us to depict Σ
c
and Σ
b
in two-dimensional graphs.
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A B
A 2, 2 2, 1
B 1, 2 4, 4
A B
A 0, 0 6, 1
B 1, 10 2, 2
A B
A 1, 0 0, 5
B 0, 1 5, 0
A B
A 2, 2 0, 0
B 2, 2 1, 1
Table 5: A symmetric coordination game, an asymmetric game of chicken, an asymmetric
matching-pennies game, and a non-generic game with a continuum of Nash equilibria.
R B Y
R 6, 6 7, 1 2, 7
B 1, 7 6, 6 7, 0
Y 7, 2 0, 7 6, 6
R B Y
R 6, 6 2, 20 2, 0
B 20, 2 0, 0 0, 5
Y 0, 2 5, 0 5, 5
R B Y
R 6, 6 0, 2 1, 2
B 2, 0 5, 5 1, 3
Y 2, 1 3, 1 4, 4
Table 6: A symmetric 3 × 3 game with a unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
(left panel), a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium (middle panel), and the maximum
number of symmetric equilibra (right panel).
TheM equilibria for the asymmetric game of chicken and the asymmetric matching-pennies
game can be worked out similarly. In the game on the far-right in Table 5, B is the weakly
dominant choice for Row and A is the dominant choice for Column. The Nash equilibria are
p = 1 and q ∈ [0, 1] and the trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium is p = 1 and q = 0. In this
non-generic example, there is an M -equilibrium of full dimension, i.e. Σ
c
= [1
2
, 1] × [0, 1
2
] and
Σ
b
= [0, 1]2, and a non-colorable M -equilibrium of lower dimension, i.e. Σ
c
= Σ
b
= {1}× [0, 1].
Example 4. Next, consider the three symmetric 3× 3 games in Table 6. The left-most game
has a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the middle game is dominance solvable and has
a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, while the right-most game has the maximal number
(7) of symmetric Nash equilibria (three pure strategy and four mixed-strategy equilibria). The
corresponding M -equilibrium sets are shown in Figure 5.
Different from the 2×2 case, the symmetricM -equilibrium choice sets for the 3×3 case may
contain neither a Nash-equilibrium profile nor the the random-behavior profile. For example,
the bottom panel shows a case of a completely disconnected set for which this is the case.9 The
middle panels show a case where both players choosing “yellow” is the unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. Most of the belief set is “blue,” however, and these beliefs support choice
profiles where “blue”’ is the most likely choice.
9We will discuss this possibility in more detail in the next section where we compare M equilibrium with
parametric theories such as QRE.
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Figure 4: The left panels show the M -equilibrium choice sets and the right panels show the
M -equilibrium belief sets for the four games in Table 5. The belief sets are shown in the same
color as the actions they support. In the left panels, the square at the center indicates the
uniform randomization profile and the disks / line indicate Nash equilibria.
18
Figure 5: The left panels show the M -equilibrium choice sets and the right panels show the
M -equilibrium belief sets for the three games in Table 6. The belief sets are shown in the same
color as the actions they support. In the left panels, the square at the center indicates the
uniform randomization profile and the disks indicate Nash equilibria.
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Proposition 4 Generically,
(i) |M(G)| may be even or odd, and may be less than, equal, or greater than the number of
Nash equilibria.
(ii) An M-equilibrium may contain zero, one, or multiple Nash equilibria.
(iii) The measure of an M-equilibrium choice set is bounded by
∏n
i=1 1/|Ci|!
(iv) In contrast, an M-equilibrium belief set may have full measure.
Proof. Properties (i)-(ii) are demonstrated by Figures 4 and 5. Property (iv) holds, for
instance, for any dominance-solvable game. Property (iii) follows since each Ci can be parti-
tioned into |Ci|! equally-sized subsets indexed by the ranks of the entries of the choice profiles
it contains. Since ranki(σ
c
i ) must be constant on an M -equilibrium choice set for all i ∈ N , the
M -equilibrium choice set must be contained in the Cartesian product of a single such subset
for each player. Hence, its size cannot be larger than
∏n
i=1 1/|Ci|!
A priori, the set-valued nature of M equilibrium might have been considered a drawback as it
might render its predictions non-falsifiable. Proposition 4 shows this is not the case. The size
of an M -equilibrium choice set falls quickly (in fact, factorially or exponentially fast) with the
number of players and the number of possible choices.
Our interest in colorableM -equilibria is based on the intuition that they are the empirically
relevant ones. To make this precise, we define a new stability notion called behavioral stability.
For ε > 0, let G(ε) denote the set of normal-form games that result from G by perturbing any
of its payoff numbers by at most ε.
Definition 3 We say that (σc, σb) ∈ Σ× Σn is a behaviorally stable profile of the normal-
form game G if there exists an ε > 0 such that (σc, σb) ∈ M(G′) for all G′ ∈ G(ε). Let B(G)
denote the closure of the set of behaviorally stable profiles of G.
In words, a choice-belief profile is behaviorally stable for the game G if it is M -equilibrium
profile for G as well as for all nearby games. Note that behavioral stability is a sharpening of the
“strategic stability” criterion introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). The latter requires
a strategically-stable Nash profile to be “close to” the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game.
Behavioral stability, in contrast, requires the M -equilibrium profile to be an M -equilibrium of
the perturbed game.
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Proposition 5 If M ∈M(G) is colorable then M ⊆ B(G).
Proof. Profiles in the interior of a colorable M -equilibrium are those for which the rank
correspondence is single valued, i.e. that can be characterized by a single vector r ∈ R. This
means that at those profiles, expected payoffs can be strictly ranked. Since expected payoffs are
continuous in the payoff numbers, they will be ranked the same for games that are sufficiently
close. Hence, the interior of M is contained in B(G), and since B(G) is closed, M ⊆ B(G).
Remark 2. Generically, only colorable M -equilibrium profiles are behaviorally stable. For
instance, for the game in the left panel of Table 3 only the profiles in the full-dimensional
set in the top panel of Figure 3 are behaviorally stable. However, it is readily verified that
for the matching-pennies game of Example 1, the behaviorally stable set consists of a single
non-colorable M -equilibrium profile.
4. Parametric Models of Stochastic Choice
Like M equilibrium, the parametric models introduced in this section obey the ordinal mono-
tonicity condition that choice probabilities are ordered the same as their associated expected
payoffs. Unlike set-valued M equilibrium, however, their predictions are based on fixed-points.
For i ∈ N , let µi ∈ Σi and let Ri(µi) = {µik}Ki!k=1 denote the set of vectors that result by
permuting the elements of µi. For i ∈ N , we define player i’s rankµii correspondence as follows
rankµii (πi) = Conv
({
σi ∈ Ri(µi) | ∀ k, ℓ such that σik > σiℓ ⇒ πik ≥ πiℓ
})
(5)
The rankµii correspondence includes random behavior and best response behavior as special
cases and satisfies a generalized idempotence condition.
Proposition 6 For all i ∈ N ,
(i) rankµii (πi) = σ
u
i for all πi ∈ IRKi when µi = σu.
(ii) rankµii (πi) = ranki(πi) for any µi ∈ Ri.
(iii) rankµii (πi) = BRi(πi) for any µi ∈ Ei.
(iv) rankµii ◦ rankµ
′
i
i = rank
µi
i for any µi, µ
′
i ∈ Σi such that ranki(µ′i) is single valued.
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(v) rankµi(µi) = µi for any µi ∈ Σi.
For µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ Σ, let rankµ denote the concatenation of the rankµii for i ∈ N .
Definition 4 We say (σc,Σ
b
) is a µ-Equilibrium of the normal-form game G if, for all
σb ∈ Σb,
σc ∈ rankµ(π(σb)) (6)
and Σ
b
is the closure of the largest set, Σb, such that rankµ(π(σb)) = rankµ(π(σc)) for all
σb ∈ Σb. The set of all µ-equilibria of G is denoted Eµ(G).
The image of the rankµ correspondence is a closed and convex set (see e.g. Figure 2 for the
case of µ ∈ R and µ ∈ E). Existence of a µ-equilibrium thus follows from Kakutani’s (1941)
fixed-point theorem. This also implies that Σ
b
is non-empty as Σ
b ∋ σc if σc ∈ rankµ(π(σc)).
Proposition 7 Eµ(G) is non-empty for any µ ∈ Σ and any normal-form game G.
While µ-equilibrium choice profiles are defined as fixed-points, they are easy to compute. The
reason is that the right side of (6) does not vary continuously with players’ beliefs but, instead,
is a piecewise-constant function over the simplex that takes on only finitely many values.
Example 5. To illustrate the simplicity of µ-equilibrium computations, consider the asymmet-
ric game of chicken in the second panel of Table 5. Let σC = (p, 1−p) and σR = (q, 1−q) where
p (q) denotes the probability with which Column (Row) chooses A. To obtain a parsimonious
model, let µR = µC = (1
ρ, 2ρ)/(1ρ + 2ρ) where ρ ≥ 0 is a “rationality parameter.” Then the
rankµ responses are
rankµR(p) =

1
1+2−ρ if p <
4
5
[ 1
1+2ρ
, 1
1+2−ρ ] if p =
4
5
1
1+2ρ
if p > 4
5
and rankµC(q) =

1
1+2−ρ if q <
8
9
[ 1
1+2ρ
, 1
1+2−ρ ] if q =
8
9
1
1+2ρ
if q > 8
9
The rankµ responses are “flat,” i.e. rankµR(p) = rank
µ
C(q) =
1
2
, when ρ = 0, and they limit to
standard best responses when ρ = ∞. Figure 6 shows Row’s and Column’s rankµ responses
when ρ increases from 0 in the top-left panel to 5 in the bottom-right panel. The intersection
of the rankµ correspondences typically consists of an odd number of points (1 or 3) except at
ρ = 2, in which case it contains p = 4
5
and any q ∈ [1
5
, 4
5
], and at ρ = 3, when a bifurcation
occurs and the intersection contains q = 8
9
and any p ∈ [1
9
, 4
5
].
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Figure 6: Row’s (solid) and Column’s (dashed) ordinal responses for the asymmetric game of
chicken in the second panel of Table 5 when ρ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 5
2
, 3, 5} as indicated in the panels.
Figure 7: In the left panel, the colored (dashed) curves show the µ-equilibrium (logit-QRE)
choice correspondence for the asymmetric game of chicken in the second panel of Table 5 for
0 ≤ ρ ≤ ∞. The square at the center corresponds to random behavior (ρ = 0) and the disks
correspond to Nash equilibria (ρ =∞). In the right panel, the colored areas correspond to the
supporting beliefs, Σb, for the different ranges of ρ.
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More generally, let Γµ(ρ) denote the µ-equilibrium correspondence, which consists of a choice
part and an associated supporting belief part: Γµ(ρ) = (Γ
c
µ(ρ),Γ
b
µ(ρ)). The colored curves in the
left panel of Figure 7 show the µ-equilibrium correspondence while the dashed curves show the
logit-QRE correspondence. There are some similarities. Each have a “principal branch” that
starts at the center when ρ = 0 and ends at the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0)
when ρ =∞. And each have an additional branch that connects the other pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1), with the mixed equilibrium, (p∗ = 4
5
, q∗ = 8
9
).
There are also some differences. First, the µ-equilibrium correspondence can be computed
easily and characterized analytically.10 More importantly, µ-equilibrium choices are generally
supported by a range of beliefs. In the right panel of Figure 7, the three differently col-
ored rectangles show the supporting beliefs that correspond to the part of the µ-equilibrium
correspondence with the same color in the left panel. In contrast, the beliefs that support
logit-equilibrium choices are forced to be correct and, hence, have zero measure, see the dashed
curves in the right panel of Figure 7.
We next generalize the findings in Example 5. For this we need to define the two possible limit
cases, i.e. ρ = 0 and ρ =∞, more generally. The former case corresponds to random behavior,
which leads us to define: RAND = (σu, {σb | rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σu))}). The latter case
corresponds to best-response behavior, which leads to the following definition.
Definition 5 We say (σc,Σ
b
) form a belief-augmented Nash equilibrium (BEAUNE)
if σc is a best response to any belief in Σ
b
, i.e. for all σb ∈ Σb,
σc ∈ BR(π(σb)) (7)
and Σ
b
is the closure of the largest set, Σb, such that BR(π(σb)) = BR(π(σc)) for all σb ∈ Σb.
10The full description of the µ-equilibrium correspondence for the asymmetric game of chicken in the second
panel of Table 5 is:
Γµ(ρ) =

({ 11+2−ρ , 11+2−ρ }, [0, 89 ]× [0, 45 ]) if 0 ≤ ρ < 2({ 45} × [ 15 , 45 ], [0, 89 ]× { 45}) if ρ = 2({ 11+2−ρ , 11+2ρ }, [0, 89 ]× [ 45 , 1]) if 2 < ρ < 3({ 89 , 19}, [0, 89 ]× [ 45 , 1]) ∪ ([ 19 , 45 ]× { 89}, { 89} × [0, 45 ]) if ρ = 3({ 11+2−ρ , 11+2ρ }, [ 89 , 1]× [0, 45 ]) ∪ ({ 45 , 89}, { 89 , 45}) ∪ ({ 11+2ρ , 11+2−ρ }, [0, 89 ]× [ 45 , 1]) if ρ > 3
where the first part corresponds to actions and the second part to beliefs about the other player. In the above
expressions, {x, y} denotes a point and [x, y] an interval.
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For instance, for the game in Table 2 of the Introduction, Σ
b
= [0, 1]2 contains all possible
beliefs, reflecting the dominant-strategy nature of the game. In contrast, the non-degenerate
mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium profile for the asymmetric matching-pennies game in Table 5
is supported only by the profile itself.
Proposition 8 For i ∈ N , define µi(ρ) = (1ρ, 2ρ, . . . , Kρi )/
∑
k k
ρ where ρ ≥ 0, and let µ(ρ)
denote their concatenation. The µ-equilibrium correspondence
Γµ : ρ ⇒ Eµ(ρ)(G)
has the following properties for generic games:
(i) Γµ(ρ) is upper hemicontinuous.
(ii) |Γcµ(ρ)| is odd and Γbµ(ρ) has strictly positive measure for almost all ρ.
(iii) Γµ(ρ) limits to a BEAUNE when ρ→∞ and to RAND when ρ→ 0.
(iv) Γµ(ρ) has a principal branch that connects RAND to exactly one BEAUNE. The other
BEAUNE are connected as pairs.
Remark 3. These properties are standard and mimic those of the logit-QRE correspondence,
see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1996). They point out that not all Nash equilibria arise as
limit points of QRE, and they call those that do “approachable.” Likewise, not all BEAUNE
arise as limit points of Γµ(ρ) when ρ→∞. We will see, however, that colorable BEAUNE, i.e.
those that are boundary points of a colorable M -equilibrium, are approachable.
The main interest in Proposition 8 is that it offers a single-parameter alternative to logit-QRE,
which does not restrict beliefs to be correct. It would be more realistic, however, to assume that
players’ rationality parameters differ, which begs the question what choices and beliefs occur
under a heterogeneous µ-equilibrium. We next show that by varying µ, the µ-equilibrium
models “fill out” the set of M equilibria.
4.1. M Equilibrium as a Meta Theory
We first compare M equilibrium with the Luce-QRE model for which analytical solutions exist
for simple games.
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Example 6. To glean some intuition, consider the asymmetric matching-pennies game in the
third panel of Table 5. Suppose players’ choice probabilities follow from expected payoffs using
a Luce choice rule, e.g. the chance that Column and Row choose A is
p =
πρCA
πρCA + π
ρC
B
q =
πρRA
πρRA + π
ρR
B
where ρR ≥ 0 and ρC ≥ 0 are rationality parameters. These equations define the Luce-QRE
fixed-point equations, which can readily be solved for the asymmetric matching-pennies game:
pLuce(ρR, ρC) =
1
1 + 5
ρC (1−ρR)
ρCρR+1
qLuce(ρR, ρC) =
1
1 + 5
ρR(1+ρC )
ρCρR+1
And given these expressions it is straightforward to show that
⋃
ρR ≥ 0
ρC ≥ 0
{
pLuce(ρR, ρC), q
Luce(ρR, ρC)
}
= [0, 1
2
]× [1
6
, 1
2
] ∪ [1
2
, 5
6
]× [0, 1
6
]
i.e. the closure of the set of all Luce-QRE fixed-points equals the union of the “red” and “blue”
M -equilibrium choice sets in Figure 4.
While the M -equilibrium choice set envelopes all Luce-QRE profiles, the modeling of beliefs
differs sharply in the two models. M -equilibrium choices in the “red” set are supported by
“red” beliefs while “blue” actions are supported by “blue” beliefs. In other words, beliefs
and choices do not necessarily match, they just have the same color. Also, players may hold
different beliefs as long as the “color” of their choices matches that of their beliefs. In contrast,
the “colorblind” Luce-QRE model assumes that beliefs are homogeneous across players and
correct. The same is true more generally for QRE models: if σc denotes a QRE action profile
then σbi = σ
c for all i ∈ N . As a result, the collection of all QRE beliefs will have measure zero
in Σn and collection of all QRE choices can only be compared with the union of M -equilibrium
choice sets irrespective of their color.
In contrast, µ-equilibrium choices are colorable in the sense that they are supported by a
set of beliefs of the same color. We next show that µ-equilibrium choices of a certain color fill
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out the M -equilibrium choice set with the same color.
Proposition 9 Let M ∈ M(G) be colorable, i.e. characterized by a single rank vector r ∈ R,
then
M =
⋃
rank(µ)= r
Eµ(G) (8)
BEAUNE that are boundary points of a colorable M-equilibrium are approachable as is RAND.
Proof. Suppose (σc, σb) ∈ Eµ(G) for some µ with rank(µ) = r then σc ∈ rankµ(π(σb)) =
rankµ(π(σc)). Applying rank and using the properties of Proposition 6 yields rank(σc) ⊆
rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σc)), i.e. (σc, σb) ∈ M . This shows that M contains the union of the
Eµ(G) and since M is closed it follows that
M ⊇
⋃
rank(µ)= r
Eµ(G)
Conversely, if (σc, σb) is in the interior of M then we have rank(σc) = r and rank(σc) ⊆
rank(π(σb)) = rank(π(σc)). Applying rankσ
c
and using the properties of Proposition 6 yields
σc ∈ rankσc(π(σb)) = rankσc(π(σc)), i.e. (σc, σb) ∈ Eσc(G). This shows that the interior of M
is contained in the union of the Eµ(G). Since A ⊆ B implies A ⊆ B, it follows that
M ⊆
⋃
rank(µ)= r
Eµ(G)
which completes the proof of (8). Any BEAUNE (σc,Σ
b
) that is a boundary point of M can
thus be obtained as the limit of Eµ(G) when µ→ σc, while RAND follows when µ→ σu.
Remark 4. The proof uses property (iv) of Proposition 6, which only applies if the rankµ
correspondences does not “lose any information,” which explains the restriction to rank(µ)
being single valued. We conjecture that non-colorable M equilibria follow by considering µ
such that rank(µ) is multi-valued. For instance, for the matching-pennies game of Example 1,
the unique M -equilibrium is given by M = Eσu(G). More generally, we conjecture that
M(G) =
⋃
µ∈Σ
Eµ(G)
But our main interest is in the colorable M equilibria since, generically, these are the only ones
that are behaviorally stable.
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A similar comparison of M equilibrium to the union QRE, i.e. for different formulations
of the quantal response functions, is complicated by the fact that QRE assumes correct point
beliefs. As a result, the set of beliefs traced out by different QRE models has the same dimension
as the set of choice profiles, Σ, which has zero measure in the set of belief profiles, Σn. Varying
over all possible QRE models will, therefore, not “fill out” the M -equilibrium belief sets.
However, we can establish an equivalence result for the union of M -equilibrium choice sets.
Imposing correct beliefs, σbi = σ
c for i ∈ N , reduces (3) to rank(σc) = rank(π(σc)). Let R
denote the infinitely-dimensional space of regular quantal responses (see e.g. Goeree, Holt, and
Palfrey, 2016) with typical element R ∈ R, and let QRER(G) denote the set of quantal response
equilibria of G with respect to R. Moreover, let M˜c(G) denote the closure of the intersection
ofMc(G), i.e. the union of all M -equilibrium choice sets, with the simplex interior. Goeree et
al. (2018) show that
M˜c(G) =
⋃
R∈R
QRER(G)
In other words, by varying over the infinite-dimensional space of all possible quantal response
functions, the QRE fixed-points essentially “fill out” the union of M -equilibrium choice sets.
However, unlike µ-equilibrium (see Proposition 9), it is not possible to do this “color by color,”
i.e. to fill out individual M -equilibrium choice sets. Further care must be taken in interpreting
the QRE “equivalence” result as the next example shows.
Example 7. Consider the middle game in Table 6, in which R is dominated by a fifty-fifty
combination of Y and B. Using the logit formulation, the probability a player chooses R is
given by
pR =
1
1 + eλ(πY −πR) + eλ(πB−πR)
≤ 1
1 + 2 eλ((πY +πB)/2−πR)
≤ 1
3
where the first inequality follows from convexity of the exponential function and the second
inequality follows since choosing R is worse than randomizing uniformly over B and Y . Note
that the 1/3 bound holds irrespective of a player’s beliefs (in particular, beliefs don’t have to
be correct) and irrespective of the rationality parameter. As a result, there can be no logit
QRE, and no SQRE for that matter, with pR >
1
3
.11
However, there is an M -equilibrium choice set with pB > pR >
1
3
, see the blue set in
the middle-left panel of Figure 5.12 While this finding does not invalidate the result that the
11The logit QRE correspondence consists of a single curve that starts at the random choice profile and crosses
only the cyan and green sets to end at the unique Nash equilibrium.
12Expected payoffs are πR = πB + 2 − 16pR and πR = πY + 9pR − 3, so rank(σc) = rank(π(σc)) for
σc = (pR, pB , pY ) with pB > pR >
1
3 .
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union of all QRE fixed-point equals the union of all M -equilibrium choice sets (it just means
other-than-logit quantal responses are needed to produce blue QRE choices), it underscores the
impossibility for QRE to fill out individual M -equilibrium sets “color by color.” By varying
the two players’ rationality parameters, logit QRE fills out the green and cyan M -equilibrium
choice sets but it does not produce any choice profiles in the blue M -equilibrium choice set.
Given the size of its belief set (see the middle-right panel of Figure 5), the blueM equilibrium
is likely to be relevant empirically even though it cannot be reached by logit QRE. We confirm
this conjecture in the next section using a variant of the game in Table 6 with an even larger
blue choice and belief set. The main reason QRE is falsified, however, is because it assumes
homogeneous and correct beliefs. In the experiments reported below, beliefs generally differ
across subjects and beliefs differ from choices.
5. An Experiment
We report the results from a series of experiments to illustrate how M equilibrium provides a
lens through which to better understand strategic behavior in games. The experiments shared
some common features. Sixteen participants joined each experimental session. Subjects were
first given instructions in a power-point presentation that was read aloud. Subjects played two-
player matrix games with either two or three possible choices. Each game was played for either
8 rounds (the 2 × 2 games) or 15 rounds (the 3 × 3 games). In each round, participants were
randomly rematched with a different participant in a perfect stranger protocol, i.e. ensuring
that two players never played the same game together more than once. This feature was made
explicitly clear to subjects.
On the screen that showed the payoff table and that let subjects choose a row of the
matrix,13 subjects were also asked to submit their beliefs about their opponent’s choice in terms
of “percentage chances.” Belief elicitation was incentivized using a generalization of a method
proposed by Wilson and Vespa (2016), which is an implementation of Hossain and Okuis’ (2013)
binarized scoring rule (BSR). The BSR is incentive compatible for general risk-preferences and,
hence, avoids issues of risk-aversion that plague other scoring rules (e.g. quadratic scoring
rule).14 Wilson and Vespa’s (2016) method operationalizes the BSR for binary-choice settings
13All subjects played by choosing a row. For asymmetric games this simply means that Column played as
Row with a transposed payoff matrix.
14See Schotter and Trevino (2014) and Schlag et al. (2014) for discussions of belief elicitation methods.
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in a way that is simple to explain. Subjects submit the “percentage chance” with which they
believe their opponent chooses each action by moving a single slider between endpoints labeled
A and B. Any point on the slider corresponds to a unique chance of A being played (and B
with complementary chance) with the A endpoint (B endpoint) corresponding to the belief
that the opponent chooses A (B) for sure. The point chosen by the subject is then compared
with two computer-generated random points on the slider. If the chosen point is closer to the
opponent’s actual choice (one of the endpoints) than at least one of the two randomly-drawn
points then the subject receives a fixed prize. The next proposition generalizes this method so
that it can be used for general normal-form games.
Proposition 10 Consider the elicitation mechanism where player i ∈ N uses Si =
∑
j ̸=iKj
sliders, labeled Sjk for j ̸= i and k = 1, . . . , Kj, to report beliefs qjk with qjk ≥ 0 and
∑Kj
k=1 qjk =
1. For each slider, two (uniform) random numbers are drawn and player i’s belief for that slider
is “correct” if the reported belief is closer to the actual outcome (0 or 1) than at least one of the
random draws. If players are risk-neutral then the elicitation mechanism is incentive compatible
when a prize, P ≥ 0, is paid for all correct beliefs for any randomly selected subset of sliders.
If players are not risk neutral then the elicitation mechanism is incentive compatible if a prize
is paid when the stated belief is correct for a single randomly selected slider.
Proof. Let ui(x) denote player i’s utility of being paid a prize mount x (with ui(0) = 0) and
let p and q denote the concatenations of player i’s true and reported beliefs respectively. Player
i wins a prize P for slider Sjk with chance
Pjk = pjk(1− (1− qjk)2) + (1− pjk)(1− q2jk)
and gets 0 with complementary probability. If all correct beliefs for a random subset S ⊆ Si of
sliders pay a prize P then player i’s expected utility of reporting q when her true beliefs are p
is
Ui(p, q) =
∑
W ⊆S
ui(P |W |)
( |S|
|W |
) ∏
Sjk ∈W
Pjk
∏
Sjk ̸∈W
1− Pjk (9)
where W is the subset of selected sliders for which player i wins the prize P . If player i is risk
neutral, i.e. ui(x) = x, then this reduces to the expected number of wins
Ui(p, q) =
P |S|
|Si|
∑
Sjk ∈Si
Pjk
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and optimizing with respect to q yields
∇qUi(p, q) = 2 P |S||Si| (p− q)
so truthful reporting is optimal. If player i is not risk neutral then there can only be two
possible payoff outcomes, 0 and P , for the elicitation mechanism to be incentive compatible.
In other words, |S| = 1 and (9) reduces to
Ui(p, q) =
ui(P )
|Si|
∑
Sjk ∈Si
Pjk
and truthful reporting is again optimal.
After all subjects had submitted their choices and beliefs, they would be shown their opponent’s
choice, the points on the belief slider chosen by the computer, and whether their submitted
beliefs were close enough to their opponent’s actual play to win the prize. Their payoff in each
round was randomly selected to be either their payoff from the game or their payoff from the
belief elicitation task. This was done to avoid subjects hedging between the two tasks. At the
end of the experiment, subjects were informed of their total earnings and paid.
5.1. Heterogeneous and Incorrect Beliefs
First, consider the 2 × 2 asymmetric matching pennies (AMP) games in Table 7, which are
all derived from the same parametric form shown in the top-left panel. The use of a common
parametric form guarantees that the best response structure is identical across games. Hence, all
games in this family have the same unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Let p and q denote
the probability with which Column and Row choose A respectively. The Nash equilibrium for
any such game is (p∗, q∗) = (1
2
, 1
6
).15 TheM -equilibrium action set shown as the red colored area
in the left panel of Figure 8. The red colored area in the right panel shows the M -equilibrium
belief set.
The numbered points in the top-left (top-right) panel of Figure 8 show the average choices
(beliefs) in games 1-5. The ellipsis around each point represents the 95% confidence interval
for the samples means.
15The study of such games has been instrumental in the development of alternative models of strategic
behavior. See, for instance, Ochs (1995), Erev and Roth (1998), Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2003), Selten and
Chmura (2008), as well as the comment by Brunner et al. (2010) and the reply by Selten et al. (2010).
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AMP A B
A X + 10, Z W , Z + 50
B X, Y + 10 W + 10, Y
AMP1 A B
A 20, 10 10, 60
B 10, 20 20, 10
AMP2 A B
A 60, 10 10, 60
B 50, 20 20, 10
AMP3 A B
A 60, 50 10, 100
B 50, 20 20, 10
AMP4 A B
A 60, 50 10, 100
B 50, 60 20, 50
AMP5 A B
A 60, 50 50, 100
B 50, 60 60, 50
Table 7: Asymmetric Matching Pennies (AMP) games.
Result 1 In the AMP games:
(i) Subjects’ choices differ across games.
(ii) Subjects’ beliefs differ across games.
(iii) Subjects’ choices differ from their beliefs in any of the games.
(iv) Subjects’ choices are heterogeneous.
(v) Subjects’ beliefs are heterogeneous.
Support for these findings can be found in the Appendix. They are obviously at odds with
Nash and logit-QRE, which both predict that choices and beliefs are identical and homoge-
neous across all five games and that beliefs match choices. (In addition, the Nash-equilibrium
prediction, (p∗, q∗) = (1
2
, 1
6
) is far from observed choice averages.) To allow for heterogeneity
within the QRE framework, Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer (2009) propose several generaliza-
tions. Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE) allows for heterogeneous choices
by assuming that players’ rationality parameters, which determine the sensitivity of their logit
quantal responses with respect to expected payoffs, are draws from commonly-known distribu-
tions. In HQRE, players’ beliefs are thus assumed to be correct. The HQRE model is at odds
with findings (i)-(iii) and (v). The most general QRE model that allows for heterogeneity in
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Figure 8: Choices (left) and beliefs (right) in each of the five AMP games.
choices and beliefs is Subjective Quantal Response Equilibrium. SQRE assumes that players’
have subjective beliefs about the distributions that others’ rationality parameters are drawn
from. SQRE is therefore not at odds with findings (iii)-(iv), but since it is based on logit
quantal responses, it predicts no change in choices and beliefs across games, which is refuted
by findings (i) and (ii). Similarly, the level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) models, which
are based on best responses, yield identical predictions for choices and beliefs across games,
contradicting findings (i) and (ii).
Result 2 The findings in Result 1 contradict the predictions of Nash equilibrium, QRE, HQRE,
SQRE, level-k, and Cognitive Hierarchy, but accord well with M-equilibrium predictions.
Support : Set-valued M equilibrium easily accommodates the variations in choices and beliefs
across games as well as the fact that beliefs differ from choics. As can be seen from Figure 8,
average choices and beliefs fall within the M -equilibrium sets.
M equilibrium relies on the assumption of stochastic rationality. This posits that subjects
will choose the alternative that is best, given their beliefs, more often. In Table 8 we report the
fraction of best responses given stated beliefs for the five games. As can be seen, these range
between .55 and .75, which is in accordance with stochastic rationality.
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AMP game 1 2 3 4 5 average
Row .61 .56 .55 .60 .58 .58
Column .75 .73 .66 .72 .75 .72
average .68 .65 .61 .66 .67 .65
Table 8: Fraction of best responses for each role in each of the five AMP games.
DS1 A B C
A 80, 80 30, 160 20, 10
B 160, 30 30, 30 10, 40
C 10, 20 40, 10 30, 30
DS2 A B C
A 75, 75 5, 155 190, 5
B 155, 5 5, 5 180, 15
C 5, 190 15, 180 200, 200
NL A B C
A 70, 70 60, 500 10, 50
B 500, 60 40, 40 0, 61
C 50, 10 61, 0 30, 30
KM A B C
A 120, 120 90, 60 60, 120
B 60, 90 90, 90 60, 90
C 120, 60 90, 60 30, 30
Table 9: A symmetric 3 × 3 game with a unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
(left panel), a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium (middle panel), and the maximum
number of symmetric equilibria (right panel).
5.2. M Equilibrium Multiplicity
Next consider the two symmetric 3 × 3 games in the first row of Table 9. As in the AMP
experiments, these two games share the same underlying parametric structure.16 As a result,
both have the same best-response structure and a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies:
{C,C}. In fact, note that these games are dominance solvable. One might reasonably expect
Nash to predict well and that behavior would be homogeneous across the two games.
Subjects’ behavior does not support these predictions. The top-left (top-right) panel of
Figure 9 shows average choices (beliefs) in the two experiments. Like in the 2× 2 AMP exper-
iments, observed choices and beliefs are far from Nash and from each other. Our theory and,
in particular, the multiplicity of M equilibria for these games allows for a better understanding
of these results.
The M -equilibrium choice and belief sets for these games are shown in Figure 9. Notice
16In particular one game can be obtained by the other by adding a constant to each column (row) of Row’s
(Column’s) payoffs.
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that there are four M equilibrium sets. The Nash equilibrium is part of the yellow set, which
is supported by a relatively small M -equilibrium belief set. The blue choice set is the furthest
from Nash but is supported by the largest belief set. Multiplicity introduces the issue of
strategic coordination. Two players may be both playing M -equilibrium strategies supported
by the corresponding M equilibrium beliefs, but the two could be different. In DS1, subjects
seem to coordinate on the blue equilibrium, as both average choices and beliefs fall within the
corresponding M equilibrium sets. This is not the case for DS2, where average choices fall
outside of any M -equilibrium choice set.
Our explanation is that even though the games share the same best response structure, the
differences in the payoff matrices induce different beliefs in the two games. In DS2, predicting
the opponent’s play is harder, leading to a higher degree of strategic mis-coordination. To see
why, notice that in DS1, options A and B offer an attractive “upside” and the same “downside”
as C. This makes the upper left sub-matrix focal. In DS2, the high payoff at {C,C} makes
the Nash equilibrium more salient but the upper-left sub-matrix also remains focal because it
provides safer options.
To examine these assertions, we provide a more detailed analysis of the beliefs and their
nexus to choices in the experiment. We separate elicited beliefs in each of the two games in
different clusters using the k-means algorithm (MacQueen, 1967). We then take the average of
the choices corresponding to beliefs in each cluster. The middle and bottom panels of Figure 9
show the results of this exercise.
As one can see from the middle panels of Figure 9, in DS 1 elicited beliefs are mainly
concentrated in the lower side of the blue belief set. The corresponding average choices are
also in the blue choice set, indicating that subjects in this game are mostly playing the blue
M equilibrium. Interestingly, in the two small clusters were beliefs are outside of the blue set,
the corresponding average choices are very close to the set of the same color, indicating that in
some instances some subjects did play a different M equilibrium.
The bottom panels of Figure 9 correspond to DS2. As we expected, elicited beliefs here are
more spread out, with a substantial number lying outside of the blue set. Nevertheless, except
for two clusters (depicted by the cyan and magenta colored circles) in all other cases average
choices lie within or very close to the set of the same color of the corresponding beliefs. In
contrast to DS1, the blue set contains the average choices of only two of these clusters, while
one of the clusters is essentially playing the M equilibrium that includes Nash.
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Figure 9: The colored sets indicate the four M equilibria for the DS1 and DS2 games and the
black circle at the top indicates the unique Nash equilibrium. In the top panels, the colored
circles indicate the average choices (left) and beliefs (right) for DS1 (red) and DS2 (green).
The middle (DS1) and bottom (DS2) panels show a k-means analysis for the DS games. The
k-means algorithm was performed on the elicited belief data. Each colored circle corresponds
to the average choices (left) and elicited beliefs (right) within each cluster. The size of the
circles is proportional to the number of observations belonging to the particular cluster.
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5.3. No Logit
We obtain similar results for the symmetric 3 × 3 game in the lower left of Table 9, labeled
“NL” for “no Logit.” For this game {C,C} is also the unique Nash equilibrium and there are
again four M equilibria. These are depicted in the graphs of Figure 10.
The two with the largest belief sets also have the largest choice sets and are therefore
expected to be empirically most relevant. An interesting feature in this game is that the
profiles in the blue equilibrium cannot be part of any logit-QRE (see also Example 7 above).
Nevertheless, as can be seen from the experimental results depicted in Figure 10, both the blue
and the cyan M equilibria are empirically relevant. A k-means clustering analysis again shows
strong evidence of strategic mis-coordination and reveals that the majority of choices (62%)
are in the “no Logit” blue region.
As pointed out above, the issue of equilibrium-multiplicity only arises in the context of M
equilibrium – the “no Logit” game has a unique Nash equilibrium as well as a unique QRE. The
strategic coordination problems uncovered by the choice and belief data cannot be explained
through the lens of existing behavioral game-theory models.
5.4. Stability
Next we take up the issue of stability. Definitions of stability abound, but generally the concept
tries to capture the robustness of some equilibria to perturbations of game form perception
(“strategic stability”). It follows that that stable equilibria are the empirically valid ones. As
mentioned before, profiles in the interior of M equilibrium sets are behaviorally stable, which
is a stronger notion than strategic stability stability.
When multipleM equilibria exists, as is the case for the two DS games, stability cannot help
predict the empirical relevance of any of them. Here instead, we look at a game with multiple
Nash equilibria (bottom left of Table 9), identified by McLennan (2016) as one where “observed
behavior will not be characterized by repetition of any one of the equilibria.” This prediction
follows the application of his index +1 principle, introduced in that paper, and because the
six pure strategy Nash equilibria can be arranged in a circle, where mixtures of any adjacent
pure equilibria are mixed equilibria.17 The KM game is originally introduced in Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). In stark contrast to this prediction of instability we find the existence of a
17As McLennan (2016) points out, a more precise (albeit less catchy) version of the “index +1 principle”
is the “Euler characteristic equals index principle.” Demichelis and Ritzberger (2003) show that the latter
condition is necessary for any “natural” dynamic process of adjustment to converge. For the KM game, the
Euler characteristic of the set of Nash equilibria is zero, while its index is +1.
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Figure 10: Behavior in the NL game. The colored sets correspond to the four M equilibrium
sets for this game. The two graphs on the top show average choices (left) and elicited beliefs
(right). The two bottom graphs show the data organized in clusters obtained using the k-means
algorithm on the elicited beliefs data. Each colored circle corresponds to the average choices
(left) and elicited beliefs (right) within each cluster. The size of the circles is proportional to
the number of observations belonging to the particular cluster.
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Figure 11: KM game. The colored sets correspond to the unique symmetric M equilibrium
sets for the game. The colored circles indicate the average choices (left) and beliefs (right) for
each of six clusters obtained through the k-means algorithm. Each circle’s size is proportional
to the number of observations in the respective cluster.
unique symmetric and behaviorally stable M equilibrium.
Figure 11 shows the M equilibrium for the KM game. The data from the experiment is
shown here already broken down in clusters, using the same procedure as before. It is clear
from the picture that the unique symmetric M equilibrium captures almost the entirety of
subjects’ behavior, both in terms of choices and beliefs. This provides further support for M
equilibrium, and behavioral stability, as an empirically relevant theory.
6. Summary
This paper introduces a novel set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, which is based on
an ordinal monotonicity condition – players’ choice probabilities are ranked the same as their
associated expected payoffs – and an ordinal consistency condition – players’ beliefs result in
the same ranking of expected payoffs as their choices.
The first condition, also known as stochastic rationality, captures the idea that unbiased
mistakes dilute choice probability away from better to worse options but not to the extent that
they overturn their ranking. The rationale behind the second condition is that there is no reason
to improve beliefs when doing so leaves choices unaffected. For instance, in the dominance-
solvable game of the Introduction (see Table 2), all beliefs result in the same ranking of choices
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and there is no need to correctly anticipate the other’s behavior. The ordinal consistency
condition underlying M equilibrium captures this “no-need-for-change” intuition.
We prove existence of a finite number of M equilibria, each with a finite number of com-
ponents, for any normal-form game (Propositions 1 and 2). We show that Nash equilibria are
typically not examples of M equilibria. Rather, Nash equilibria arise as “abstract limit points
of the M -equilibrium planes,” to paraphrase Mondrian. There may be an even or odd number
of M equilibria, fewer or more M equilibria than Nash equilibria, and an M equilibrium may
contain any number of Nash equilibria. Importantly, the measure of any M -equilibrium choice
set falls quickly with the number of players and the number of possible choices (Proposition
4). We show that, generically, M equilibria can be “color coded” by a single rank vector in
the sense that choices and supporting beliefs are of the same color. We introduce the concept
of behavioral stability, which strengthens Kohlberg and Merten’s (1986) strategic stability,
and show that colorable M equilibria are the behaviorally stable ones (Proposition 5).
We introduce a new class of parametric µ-equilibrium models, which replace players’ best-
response correspondences with rank-based correspondences. We prove existence of µ equilib-
rium for any normal-form game (Proposition 7) and show that, unlike QRE, the µ-equilibrium
choices can be easily and analytically determined. Importantly, µ-equilibrium choices are sup-
ported by a set of beliefs. As a result, µ-equilibrium beliefs may be heterogeneous and incorrect.
In other words, µ-equilibrium allows for “mistakes” as well as “surprises,” again unlike QRE,
which assumes homogeneous and correct beliefs.
A common criticism of parametric models like µ equilibrium and QRE is that they intro-
ducing “degrees of freedom” into the theory. QRE, for instance, requires the specification of
players’ quantal responses, which are elements of an infinite-dimensional space. This begs the
question whether QRE can be falsified. Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok (2008) suggest the an-
swer is “no,” although their proof uses quantal responses that violate stochastic monotonicity.
In contrast, most of the QRE literature considers regular quantal responses that obey stochastic
monotonicity, see e.g. Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2016). Nonetheless, also the set of regular
quantal responses is infinite dimensional, so the question remains whether QRE is falsifiable.
We answer this question through the lens of M equilibrium. In particular, we show that M
equilibrium, a parameter-free and set-valued solution concept, is ameta theory that minimally
envelopes various parametric fixed-pointmodels, including µ-equilibrium and QRE (see Proposi-
tion 9 and subsequent discussion) and other models obeying stochastic rationality. Proposition
4 shows that the measure of any M -equilibrium choice set falls factorially fast with the number
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of players and possible choices, confirming that the parametric models can (easily) be falsified.18
We testM equilibrium in a series of experiments. Five versions of an asymmetric matching-
pennies game, which differ only by additive constants to the payoffs, show significantly different
choices and beliefs. This finding is problematic for all existing behavioral game-theory models
(level-k, SQRE and its HQRE/TQRE/QRE descendants, Cognitive Hierarchy), but is easily
accommodated by set-valued M equilibrium.
Further experiments based on dominance-solvable 3 × 3 games with a unique Nash equi-
librium and four M equilibria raise the possibility of mis-coordination and highlight the role
of beliefs. In one version of a dominance-solvable game, elicited beliefs predict that choices
are mainly in the M -equilibrium set furthest away from the unique Nash equilibrium – and
they are. In an “equivalent” version, beliefs predict that choices are scattered over the four
M equilibria – and they are. See Figure 9. In another experiment, beliefs predict that choices
are mostly in the region that logit-QRE cannot attain – and they are. See Figure 10. A final
experiment, predicted to result in unstable actions and beliefs, shows the empirical relevance of
behavioral stability. The KM game has a uniqueM equilibrium to which both choice and belief
data conform. See Figure 11. Combined these findings confirm the potential of M equilibrium
as an empirically relevant game theory.
7. Outlook
Nasar’s (1998) book “A Beautiful Mind” details how Nash was disappointed by the lack of
empirical support for his solution concept, which led him to return to doing research in pure
mathematics. Interestingly, some of the machinery Nash developed underlies the alternative
approach pursued in this paper. For example, an M equilibrium is a semi-algebraic set with
finitely many components of different dimensions (see Section 3.1, in particular, Figure 3),
which are now known as “Nash cells” (e.g. Coste, 2005).
In retrospect, von Neumann’s reaction when Nash introduced him to his solution concept –
“that’s just a fixed-point” – may have foreshadowed its empirical weakness. The Nash equilib-
rium predicts certain choice profiles without detailing how they come about – they are simply so-
lutions to some fixed-point equations. Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), developed almost
18Furthermore, Example 7 shows there exist M -equilibrium sets that contain no logit-QRE at all. The “no
Logit” experiment was inspired by this example. We find that the majority of the choice data (62%) is in the
“no Logit” region.
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half a century later (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), takes the role of fixed-points even further by
requiring that both choices and beliefs derive from them. Even in a simple dominant-strategy
solvable game, the resulting non-transcendental equations can only be solved numerically, when
Nash-equilibrium choices are supported irrespective of players’ beliefs.19 As the experimental
results reported in this paper highlight, and as von Neumann intuited, the assumption of homo-
geneous and correct beliefs that drives fixed-points theories like Nash and QRE, is untenable.
In none of the experiments reported in this paper are beliefs homogeneous or correct.
Yet choices and beliefs are more likely to be “right” than “wrong.” This is the simple
premise underlying the M -equilibrium: players’ choice probabilities are ranked the same as the
expected payoffs based on their beliefs, and players’ beliefs yield the same ranking of expected
payoffs as their choices. The mathematical consequences of this simple premise are governed
by semi-algebraic geometry, a field in mathematics that Nash made distinguished contributions
to. Importantly, the empirical consequences of this simple premise are corroborated by belief
and choice data from several of our experiments.
Of course, M equilibrium will not be universally correct. There are well-documented cases
where behavioral factors (e.g. other-regarding preferences, risk aversion, etc.) play an impor-
tant role. These factors can be incorporated in an extension of the theory by replacing expected
payoffs with expected utilities. But even when accounting for behavioral elements, M equi-
librium is unlikely to always be correct. Given the minimal assumptions that M equilibrium
imposes, the reason it fails then offers important insights about behavior. Is stochastic ratio-
nality violated or is it that beliefs do not satisfy a minimal consistency condition? Whether
correct or not, M equilibrium offers a novel and promising approach toward an empirically
relevant game theory.
19In Crawford’s (2018) words “QRE is a fixed point in a high-dimensional space of distributions, making its
thinking justification cognitively far more demanding than for Nash equilibrium.”
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A. Support for Result 1
Support : (i) As can be seen in the top left graph of figure 8, there is very little overlap between
the confidence intervals for the average choice frequncies in the five games. Formal statistical
testing confirms this. The left panel of table 10 reports the p-values from a Hotteling’s t-test
in pairwise comparisons of the average choice frequency in different games. In most cases,
pairwise comparisons show differences that are significant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis
that average choice frequencies in all games are jointly equal can be rejected at the 1% level.20
This remains true even when excluding game 4 from the test, as it is the single most different
game.
(ii) Again, one can see in the top right graph of figure 8 that there is little overlap of the
confidence intervals for average beliefs for the five games. The results of Hotteling’s t-tests for
the comparison of means confirms what is observed in the graph. The right panel of table 10
reports the p-values from the test. Average beliefs are statistically different across games for
any reasonable significance level.
(iii) A careful inpsection of the two top graphs in figure 8 reveals that for all five games,
average choice frequencies lie far from the corresponding average reported beliefs. Again, using
Hotelling’s t-test we confirm this finding. The p-values from comparing actions to beliefs in
each of the games are very close to zero in all five cases.
(iv) Figure 12 shows the empirical cumulative density functions (cdf’s) for the average choice
by Row and Column in each game. If actions were homogeneous, then these should look like the
cdf for the observed success rate in a binomial distribution with 8 trials and a true success rate
in each trial equal to the average choice across all individuals. We use a Monte Carlo simulation
with 1000 repetitions to produce this cdf and compare the two. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test we can reject that the two are the same for all cases at the 1% level for all games except
game 2. For game 2 we can reject at the 5% level for Row (p-val = .031 ) but not for Column
(p-val = .117 ). This result is further supported by a Cochran’s Q test comparing individual
choices in each game to one another. The test rejects those being the same for both Row and
Column in all games for any level of significance.
(v) We use Friedman’s test to compare reported beliefs across individuals in each game,
20For the joint test we use the Bonferroni correction. The null of simultaneous equality is rejected at a level
of significance α by comparing the lowest p-value in all m pairwise comparisons to αm and rejecting whenever it
is lower. This ensures that the family-wise error rate (FWER), which is the probability that at least one of the
averages is not equal to the others, remains at the desired level α. This is the most conservative test based on
the FWER, in the sense that it rejects the null less often.
46
actions 2 3 4 5
1 .2334 .0011 .0045 .0863
2 .1374 .0004 .0052
3 .0000 .0000
4 .04913
beliefs 2 3 4 5
1 .0000 .0000 .0045 .6374
2 .0489 .0974 .0000
3 .0001 .0000
4 .0002
Table 10: Experiment 1: p-values from pairwise comparisons between games.
separately for Row and Column. In all cases we find there is heterogeneity that is significant
at any reasonable significance level.
Figure 12: Heterogeneity of actions in Experiment 1. Empirical cdf’s for subjects’ actions
(blue) and cdf’s of the observed success rate in MC simulations of binomial distributions with
8 trials and true success rate equal to subjects’ overall average choice (orange).
B. Cluster analysis with the k-means algorithm.
As mentioned in the main text, we classify our data of elicited beliefs into different clusters.
This is done in a theory-free way using the k-means algorithm (MacQueen, 1967). The way it
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works is as follows. Given k, the number of clusters one wants to use, k random ‘centroids’ are
chosen, which are points in the same space as that of the data. In the next step, each observation
is matched to its closest centroid. To determine closeness we use the euclidean distance that is
the standard option in this class of problems. Next, new centroids are calculated by taking the
mean of the observations in each cluster. The algorithm proceeds iteratively until it converges
to a stable set of clusters.
While convergence is guaranteed, the resulting clusters will depend on the random initiali-
sation of the algorithm. To address the issue we take the standard approach which is to repeat
the analysis for a large number of times (5000 in our case) and choose the outcome with the
smallest sum of errors (distance of each observation from its cluster centroid).
The final issue to address is the number of clusters, k. We approach the problem using what
is dubbed the ‘elbow method’. We run the analysis for k ∈ {2, ..., 15} and calculate the sum of
errors in each case. This is then plotted against k, giving a convex, decreasing curve. For each
game we choose the k that is at the ‘elbow’ of the curve. Figure 13 shows the curves for the
case of the two DS games. The In the analysis in the main text we use k = 7 for these games.
Figure 13: K means in the DS games. The curves show the sum of distances for different values
of k for DS1 (blue line) and DS2 (red line).
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